Media systems around the world have changed in significant ways in the early twenty-first century. In this article, I analyze how various forms of media subsidies have changed in response to these transformations in a sample of six different affluent democracies. On the basis of interviews, official documents, and secondary sources, I show that media subsidies have largely remained frozen in their late-twentieth century form. The absence of major reform means that media subsidies are increasingly subject to policy drift, a process by which the operations and effectiveness of policies change not because of deliberate reform, but because of changing conditions on the ground. Analysis of interviews with relevant stakeholders suggests that the main obstacles to reform across all six countries are (1) limited political attention to the problem, (2) strong incumbent industries protecting their interests, and (3) a perceived shortage of desirable, cost-effective, and governable alternatives to existing policies.
Introduction
Media systems around the world have changed in significant ways in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Across Europe and the Anglophone world, paid printed newspaper circulation has declined, television audiences have fragmented as more and more channels compete for viewers, and the rise of the internet has confronted legacy media with new competitors for both attention and advertising. Media industries are booming in much of the world, but in the "Western world", they are going through a painful transition.
In this article, I analyze how the various forms of media subsidy that have been introduced over time in part to promote the public roles media can play as sources of news, as cultural institutions, and as checks on the abuse of power, have changed in response to these transformations. On the basis of interviews, official documents, and secondary sources from a sample of six different affluent democracies (Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States), I show that media subsidies have not changed to nearly the same extent as the sectors they are meant to support. The main forms of public sector support for media remain frozen in their late-twentieth century form, and overwhelmingly favor incumbents in the broadcasting and newspaper publishing industries. In a time of rapid convergence and digitization, the main forms of media subsidy across these otherwise quite different media systems (a) continue to be based on inherited and increasingly tenuous distinctions between broadcast and print media; (b) in five of the countries studied primarily take the form of license fee funding for public service broadcasters, and (c) secondarily (primarily in the case of the US) take the form of indirect support for paid printed newspapers, and, with the partial exception of France, (d) offer almost no meaningful support for online-only media organizations.
In many of these countries, critics have long argued that existing media subsidies are increasingly inappropriate for the times we live in. Fifteen years ago, Eli Skogerbø (1997) argued that the effectiveness of press subsidies were being undermined by technological changes in the media. Around the same time, debates about the transition from "public service broadcasting" to "public service media" also gathered pace. 1997 also saw W. Russell Neumann and his co-authors argue more broadly that the "communications revolution" sweeping the Western world would call for a whole new integrated approach to media policy (Neuman et al, 1997) . The issues surrounding the relationship between media and policy at a time of rapid technological change have not become less pressing since, and often, communication policy researchers suggest, such periods of technological change has also prompted policy change (Bar and Sandvig, 2008; Freedman, 2008; Just and Puppis 2012 ).
Yet, as I will show, little has changed when it comes to media subsidies across countries with otherwise very different political systems, regulatory traditions, and industry structures.
Many other forms of media policy have been revised, but subsidies remain broadly the same.
Interviews with political, regulatory, and industry stakeholders suggest that three major obstacles to reform are common to all six countries, transcending other important difference in media policy and policy processes. The first obstacle is relatively limited high-level political attention to the policy challenges associated with current changes in the media industries. The second obstacle is effective lobbying by incumbent industries trying to protect their interests and fearful that any reform will be at their expense. The third obstacle is a perceived shortage of politically appealing, cost-effective, and governable alternatives to existing policies. The three obstacles can be summarized as 'the devil that don't care', 'the devil you know', and 'the devil you don't know.' The analysis thus suggests that proponents of media policy reform need to deal simultaneously with a set of political obstacles and, importantly, convince a critical mass of key decision-makers that they have practical proposals that are superior to existing policies.
In the first part of the article, I discuss the role of media policy in media developments and outline my analytical approach and the rationale behind the six countries covered. In part two, I analyze the media subsidy arrangements in place in the six countries considered, examining both differences and similarities. In part three, I review the policy debates surrounding these arrangements over the last decade, and discuss the main roadblocks to reform.
Media policy and media development
Every media sector, from newspaper publishing and terrestrial broadcasting over traditional telecommunications to new internet protocol-based web and mobile services, is intertwined with different public policies. Some of these are developed via international organizations like the WTO and supranational organizations like the European Union, and many policies and paradigms are disseminated via various transnational networks, but in the case of large, affluent democracies, the main locus of media policy formation remains the nation state (Levy 1999) . The media systems these policies help form develop over time shaped by a combination of economic, technological, cultural, and political forces, and one explanation for the significantly different media systems that have developed in otherwise in many ways similar affluent Western democracies is that different countries have for decades pursued different media policies (Humphreys, 1996; Hallin and Mancini, 2004) .
The focus of this article is on one particularly important part of media policy, namely different forms of direct or indirect public sector support for media organizations, whether public or private. Such media subsidies have historically been put in place in most affluent democracies with the stated aim of ensuring media pluralism and addressing potential market failures in content production (in particular in news journalism and, especially in European countries, domestic programming for television). Even in the United States, which has by far the most market-dominated media system of all Western democracies, federal, state, and local level governments provide direct and indirect subsidies worth more than $2 billion annually (Nielsen, 2011) . Both historical and comparative analysis have clearly documented that a range of different subsidies including for example distribution support through preferential postal rates, tax exemptions for print publications, and direct public support for various kinds of public service broadcasters have all played a key role in shaping the development and democratic functions of different media systems over time (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Starr, 2004; Kuhn, 2011) . As Peter Humphreys has written (1996: 2): 'Put simply, media systems can be expected to vary significantly across countries because politics and policy have made a difference.'
Critics of media subsidies have argued that state intervention threatens the independence of news organizations, inhibits the development of commercial media sectors through perverse incentive structures, and often prop up sunset incumbent industries at the expense of innovators and new entrants (see Picard, 2007 for a review of relevant critiques).
But most media scholars argue that carefully calibrated media subsidies can help underwrite the production of quality content, make media systems more diverse, and facilitate the dissemination of news to wider audiences (Humphreys, 2007; Alonso et al, 2006; and Benson and Powers, 2011) . Research from Scandinavia suggests that direct and indirect subsidies there have ensured greater plurality in the newspaper sector (Gustafsson et al, 2009) .
Comparative research has shown that strong public service broadcasters have resulted in a more informed and more evenly informed citizenry (Curran et al, 2009 ). Media subsidies cannot always achieve their stated goals, especially if strong economic, technological or other forces push in a different direction (Skogerbø, 1997; Picard and Grönlund, 2003; Ots, 2009 ).
But there is no doubt that they matter and that, when carefully calibrated, they can advance politically legitimized public interest goals.
The purpose of this article is to assess whether such a calibration, an adjustment of media subsidies to take into account changes in the industries they intervene in, has taken place in recent years in a range of different affluent democracies. The countries covered are Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample includes countries with different political systems, different state formations and regulatory traditions, and different economic structures. They also represent two of each of the ideal typical media system models developed by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) , the 'democratic corporatist model' (Finland and Germany), the 'polarized pluralist model' (France and Italy), and 'liberal model' (the United Kingdom and the United States).
1 Analysis of these six countries affords an opportunity to provide an update to existing, and increasingly dated, reviews of media subsidies (Picard, 1987; Murschetz, 1998) and to examine media policy reform or the absence thereof across a wide variety of politically, economically, and media-wise different cases.
Most media policy reform is gradual as existing policies are renegotiated and tweaked periodically and new elements are added in an incremental fashion (Bar and Sandvig, 2008) .
Over time, various forms of media subsidy have been introduced and gradually accrued, often with little concern for how they interact with existing policies (Lund, 2009 (Schickler, 2001: 13) .
At some points in time, however, media policy has been subject to more deliberate and large-scale reforms, often in response to rapid technological change and/or new prevailing political and ideological winds (Bar and Sandvig, 2008; Freedman, 2008; Just and Puppis, 2012 (Humphreys, 1996; Freedman, 2006) . (This is confirmed by the research behind this article-even interviewees from countries like Finland and France, with strong post-war traditions of state intervention in the media industry, often spoke out strongly against the idea of introducing new forms of media subsidies today, and tended to cast the state more as a 'facilitator' responsible for 'framework conditions'.) Public service broadcasters remain at the center of media systems in most of Western Europe, but they are subject to everincreasing competition, and in countries where direct subsidies have been made available to private newspaper publishers, these have been cut back in recent years due to a combination of national political priorities and pressure from the European Commission (Harcourt, 2005) .
Processes of policy change are influenced in important ways by such high-level paradigmatic shifts in the dominant ideas of political elites and other stakeholders. But as policy analysts underline, they are also shaped by more concrete interactions between specific formal and informal actors within a particular policy subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 2007) . In understanding how media subsidies have been shaped in recent years, the article combines data from official documents and secondary sources with information from interviews with select stakeholders in each of the six countries. In light of the ways in which incumbent interests tend to dominate media policy processes, the interviewees include politicians from both sides of the political spectrum, media regulators, policy analysts have often suggested that ten years is a suitable time frame for studying policy reform or the absence thereof (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 2007) .
Media subsidies, 2000-2009
Though the first ten years of the twenty-first century have seen dramatic change in Western media systems, most forms of media subsidy remains unchanged. Table 1 of several large sheets folded rather than bound together, and contain information about current events of local, national or international interest.' (This is why the Wolverhampton Express and Star charges £2.34 per week for a full subscription to a print, online, and mobile package, whereas online and mobile alone-subject to VAT-costs £2.81.) Such definitions seems to be of declining relevance when it comes to understanding people's actual media use and are in any case irrelevant to the notional motivations for providing public support for media in the first place. Second, the vast majority of the public funds used directly and indirectly to support media operations continue to be channeled to legacy players that have grown out of the previously technologically distinct media markets of broadcasting and print, namely public service media organizations and incumbents in the paid printed newspaper industry.
With the exception of the modest subsidy for online news services in France, all the subsidies in table 1 were put in place before the beginning of current media system transformations. They are generally designed in ways that, often without intending to, makes it hard to integrate new, digital media. Consider just a few examples. License fees overwhelmingly fund broadcasting services. In 2009, the BBC, widely considered a pioneering PSB online, spent about 6 percent of its total budget on online services. Other
PSBs spent far less than this (Brevini, 2010) . Most online media sites are free to access today, so even if VAT exemptions for sales revenues were expanded to include them, the value would be limited. Indirect subsidies for the distribution of print products can be provided through favorable rates offered by national postal services, but governments have not regulated the rates charged to individual private news providers by server farms and internet service providers. Thus, while license fees and indirect subsidies to legacy players in public service broadcasting and the paid printed newspaper industry partially underwrite their online activities, these forms of support are far from platform-neutral. They are in fact heavily tied to inherited forms of distribution and the organizations built around them.
Support for various incumbents thus makes up the vast majority of all public support for media in all six of the countries considered here. Figure 1 shows the total estimated value of the main forms of state intervention calculated as current Euros per capita annually to facilitate cross-national comparison (adopted from Nielsen, 2011) . Support for public service media organizations is the single largest factor in all countries apart from the US. The second largest factor in five countries (the largest in the US) is indirect support for the press, mostly through VAT exemptions. Direct support to the press follows at third in the three countries where it is provided (Finland, France, and Italy). Only one country-France-provides direct public support for online-only operations. Negligible till 2008, they still amounts only to a modest €0.3 per capita annually even after the increase in 2009. The figure confirms that long-standing national differences in the scale and scope of public sector support for media remain in place-technological change, Europeanization, and the globalization of some areas of media policy have clearly not eroded all national differences. Picard, 2007; Ots, 2009; for sustained criticism of the present state of Scandinavian press subsidy arrangements, and Iosifidis, 2010 for a collection of essays discussing some of the major challenges confronting PSBs.) Media subsidies today are subject to what political scientists call 'policy drift'-changes in the operation and effect of policies that themselves remain stable, driven by change in the sector they are meant to address. As Jacob Hacker (2004: 246) writes, 'the hallmark of change of this sort is that it occurs largely outside the immediate control of lawmakers, thus appearing natural or inadvertent.' Of course policy drift is neither natural nor necessarily inadvertent-it is the outcome of inaction, the absence of reform. This absence of reform in turn calls for an explanation, especially during a time of rapid technological change, as research suggests technological change have in the past prompted policy change (Bar and Sandvig, 2008; Freedman, 2008; Just and Puppis, 2012) .
Three obstacles to media subsidy reform
Most of the people interviewed for this research recognize that changes in the media suggest Italy, and to some extent the UK, less of the same.
From the outside, policy drift of the kind happening in the media subsidy area can appear as the inadvertent consequence of changing conditions combined with political passivity. But as policy analysts often note, the absence of action-'negative policy' (Freedman, 2008 )-calls for explanation as much as action does, especially because technological change has often prompted policy change in the past. It is clear from both public debate and interviews in each of the six countries covered that many stakeholders are acutely aware that existing forms of media subsidy risk becoming marginalized unless they are changed to take into account current changes in the media sector. Why has there then been no reform?
Interviews suggest that the actors involved in the six countries see three main obstacles to substantial media subsidy reform. The first obstacle is an apparent lack of interest amongst political elites in the issue of media reform. In most countries, senior politicians have generally avoided the issue and left it to more junior figures, civil servants, and industry stakeholders. France is a partial exception. There, former President Sarkozy has taken an active and leading role. It is also the country that has seen the most substantial reform. In the absence of deliberate, high-level intervention, media policy seems to be Despite all their differences, in terms of political systems, economic structures, and in what technological change has meant for their media industries, these three obstacles are highlighted in interviews in all six countries analyzed here. Across both "liberal", the "democratic corporatist", and the "polarized pluralist" media systems, interviewees see limited high-level political interest in media reform, the strength of incumbent interests, and the absence of clearly articulated reform proposals as key obstacles to media subsidy reform.
Conclusion
Despite often substantial change in the media sector in the early twenty-first century, this article has shown that the media subsidies meant to underpin media organizations and their role as public institutions have remained largely frozen in their late twentieth-century form in much of the "Western world". The consequence of the combination of media change and the absence of reform is policy drift, as both the consequences and relative effectiveness of media subsidies change and often erode even as the policies themselves nominally remain the same. The two most important existing forms of media subsidy, direct funding for public service media organizations and indirect support for paid printed newspapers, are both particularly subject to drift-with public service media organizations increasingly competing with industry incumbents from other sectors as media platforms converge, and with the value of VAT-exemptions and distribution support declining as paid newspaper circulation drops even as unchanged subsidy arrangements perversely encourages publishers to devote extra attention to important, but declining, legacy platforms. Public service broadcasters still clearly makes a difference in terms of, for instance, keeping the population informed about public affairs (Curran et al, 2009) , and newspaper subsidies can contribute to more diverse media markets (Gustafsson et al, 2009) . But public service broadcasters face a range of challenges in their transition to a new role as public service media in changing communication environments (Iosifidis, 2010) and the efficiency of state support for printed newspapers is rapidly eroded by audiences' move towards digital platforms (Ots, 2009 ). The media continues to change, and this challenge the effectiveness of inherited and largely unchanged forms of media subsidies.
Communication policy research suggests that in the past, technological change has often prompted policy reform (Bar and Sandvig 2008 , Freedman 2008 , Just and Puppis 2012 . Even after fifteen years and many critics raising the issue, this has not happened when it comes to media subsidies. The analysis of interviews with different participants in media policy processes suggests that across all six countries examined, and across all the three "types" of media systems considered, three important obstacles to reform are (1) a relative lack of interest in media policy from many leading politicians ('the devil that don't care'), (2) the role of industry incumbents who are, whether in the public or the private sector, keen to protect their existing privileges and fear that any reform will leave them as the losers ('the devil you know') and (3) uncertainty about what reform would look like and how it could be made both effective and governable ('the devil you don't know'). The current economic climate only makes reform harder.
Even if reform is complicated, politically difficult, and uncertain in both outcome and consequences, the changing character of media systems mean that inaction-the absence of reform-is a highly consequential policy choice too. Doing nothing will not maintain the status quo, as economic, technological, and cultural forces will continue to change media systems even if media policies remain the same. With the partial exception of license feefunded public service media organizations-which are accompanied by their own policy challenges-existing forms of intervention are less and less effective and continue to protect incumbents against new entrants. Therefore, there is a strong case for revisiting existing media subsidies. But reform will not be easy. Those who wish to thaw the 'frozen' media subsidy arrangements analyzed here need to develop proposals that can build political awareness around the issue, bring together a coalition of change agents that can overcome incumbent opposition, and outline concrete solutions that address the specific problems at hand in ways that are politically legitimate, cost-effective, a well as governable. 
Germany

€7265 million
License fee (€204/household) for PSM Os ADF, ZDF, and Deutschlandradio.
€525 million
General reduced VAT for single copy sales and subscriptions.
None None
Italy
€1676 million
License fee (€106/household) for integrated PSM O RAI.
€560 million
General VAT reduction for single copy sales, subscriptions, newsprint, composition, and plant. Generally reduced postal and telephone rates.
(Additional minor subsidies are provided for press services and in the form of loan facilities.)
€161 million
Targeted subsidies for newspapers with at least two members of parliament amongst the owners or published by co-operatives of journalists. Targeted subsidies for newspapers in national minority or regional languages.
€184 million
Diverse direct subsidies to local television in the Italian regions for 'informational activities'. Also some support for minority language broadcasters and for party-affiliated broadcasting.
United Kingdom €4185 million
License fee (€190/household) for PSM O BBC.
€748 million
General VAT-exemption for copy sales and subscription sales (est. £594 million).
None None
United States
€779 million
Federal appropriations for CPB ($393m). Federal grants and contracts for PSM Os ($80m). State and local appropriations for PSM Os ($673 million).
€804 million
Various federal-and state-level tax breaks, mostly for sales revenue, advertising sales, and expenditures for expanding or maintaining circulation (more than $900 million). Reduced postal rates for newspapers and magazines (est. $282 million).
None None
Sources: Public service media funding from YLE (Finland), European Audiovisual Observatory (France, Germany, Italy, and the UK), and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (US). Indirect press subsidies from Nieminen (2010) 
Current € per capita
Public service media Indirect press support Direct press support Other forms of support 1 Many critics have argued that the UK media system, with its partisan national press and strong public service broadcasting, has more in common with the German 'democratic corporatist' media system than with the US 'liberal' system. The subsidies mapped here support that proposition-see in particular figure 1.1.
2 The interviewees were selected and carried out by researchers familiar with the country in question. Kari Karppinen did the interviews in Finland, Edda Humprecht the interviews in France and Germany, Alessio Cornia the interviews in Italy, and the author the interviews in the UK and the US. In each case, the interviewer was tasked with selecting interviewees that reflected the main stakeholders in media policy making processes in the country in question.
In total, 16 interviews were completed with politicians, government officials, and regulators, 34 interviews were completed with industry associations and representatives of individual companies, 7 interviews were completed with representatives of journalists' associations or unions, and 7 interviews were carried out with outside analysts. In all cases, the interviews have been supplemented with public material on media policy. 3 Figures on the precise value of various forms of media subsidy are not always available. As suggested by the sources given for table 1, I have relied on a combination of official sources including both precise figures from the accounts of public service broadcasters as well as government-commissioned estimates of the value of indirect subsidies, such as the Cardoso (2010) 
